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The injustices of ‘allowing certain people to succeed, based not upon merit but upon the cultural
experiences, the social ties and the economic resources they have access to, often remains unac-
knowledged in the broader society’ (Wacquant, 1998, p. 216). Cognizant of this, the authors argue
that education requires researchers’ renewed examination and explanation of its involvement in the
construction of social and economic differences. Specifically, they make the case for researchers to
consider the theoretical work of Pierre Bourdieu, outlining what they understand by a Bourdieuian
methodology, which is informed by socially critical and poststructural understandings of the world.
Such methodology attempts to dig beneath surface appearances, asking how social systems work.
By asking ‘whose interests are being served and how’ (Tripp, 1998, p. 37) in the social arrangements
we find, Bourdieu can help us to ‘work towards a more just social order’ (Lenzo, 1995, p. 17).
Introduction
Education is often perceived to be the great equalizer in an otherwise unjust society.
Since the introduction of mass schooling in the mid-nineteenth century, many
Australians have looked to public education as a basic right and a vehicle that will
furnish them with the rewards and opportunities to experience more fulfilling and
satisfying lives (Gale, 2006). Yet, as Thomson (2001) points out, there has never
been a free and democratic public education system. Because access to education has
always been at a cost to parents, schools have always favored the rich and powerful
(Connell, 1993). Indeed, there is a long history of schools having a tendency to
‘connect best with, and work best for, students of middle-class, Anglo, male
backgrounds’ (Ladwig & Gore, 1998, p. 19).
*Corresponding author: Dr Carmen Mills, Faculty of Education, The University of Southern
Queensland, P.O. Box 4196, Springfield, Queensland, 4300, Australia. Email:
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434 C. Mills and T. Gale
Mindful of the current environment in which differential student outcomes are
attributed simply to (teachers’ and/or students’) hard work or the lack of it, we argue
that education requires researchers’ renewed examination and explanation of its
involvement in the construction of social and economic differences. Specifically, we
make the case for researchers to draw on the theoretical work of Bourdieu—which is
informed by socially critical and poststructural understandings of the world—and use
research for ‘working towards justice, fairness and equity in education’ (Griffiths,
1998, p. 3). Indeed, we wish to foreground ‘starting the process of educational
research with a set of values that guide decisions about what is researched, and how
and why’ (Griffiths, 1998, p. 3, emphasis in the original). In doing this, we explore
two questions: First, what is the focus of and justification for Bourdieuian research,
which makes Bourdieu’s work particularly valuable for this kind of research agenda?
And second, how do Bourdieuian researchers produce knowledge?
These interests form the parameters for the two main sections of the article. In the
first section we identify the focus of Bourdieu’s research as social struggle and, in
particular, how marginalized groups fare in this. In naming this broad research
agenda, we claim Bourdieu as a critical social theorist with interests in uncovering
social inequalities and, by implication, how these may be transformed, although we
are conscious of his critics on this latter point. This is followed by an account of
knowledge production, à la Bourdieu. In this explanation we resist the temptation to
resort to the minutiae of particular research methods, casting some in and some out
of consideration, for this is not Bourdieu’s style. Rather, we focus on the central theo-
retical and political tenets of his methodology, identifying these as the broad inten-
tions that inform his research. Specifically, we note his theoretical dialecticism,
particularly with regard to subjectivity and objectivity and how this guides his under-
standing of what is (worth) knowing. We also identify his radical democratic politics,
which has implications for how and from where knowledge is produced. In both of
these we note Bourdieu’s predilection to make public his own positioning. On the
surface, this would seem to make an account of a Bourdieuian methodology some-
what easier, although Bourdieu himself would be wary of taking at face value what is
claimed about oneself.
We begin, then, with an account of Bourdieu’s socially critical disposition for
research, particularly with regard to how this plays out in the context of schooling and
society more broadly, and affirming the value of his work in guiding researchers in
their examination and explanation of social inequalities in education.
A Bourdieuian focus: taking a critical standpoint on social inequalities
Pierre Bourdieu and those who employ his theoretical concepts have made significant
contributions in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to understanding
the role that schools and school systems play in reproducing social and cultural
inequalities and legitimizing certain cultural practices through the hidden linkages
between scholastic aptitude and cultural heritage (Bourdieu, 1998). In the main, their
assessment has been that despite ideologies of equal opportunity and meritocracy,
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Researching social inequalities 435
few educational systems are called upon by the dominant classes ‘to do anything other
than reproduce the legitimate culture as it stands and produce agents capable of
manipulating it legitimately’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, pp. 59–60).
Informed by his research exposing the fallacy of individuals familiar with bourgeois
culture possessing any more innate intelligence or ‘giftedness’ than those who are
unfamiliar with it (see, for example, Bourdieu, 1974; Bourdieu & de Saint Martin,
1974), Bourdieu argues against what he sees as a meritocratic illusion. In such work,
he argues that it is the culture of the dominant group—that is, the group that controls
the economic, social and political resources—which is embodied within schools. In
other words, educational institutions ensure the profitability of the cultural capital of
the dominant, attesting to their gifts and merits. Educational differences are thus
frequently ‘misrecognized’ as the result of ‘individual giftedness’ rather than class-
based differences, ignoring the fact that the abilities measured by scholastic criteria
often stem not from natural ‘gifts’ but from ‘the greater or lesser affinity between class
cultural habits and the demands of the educational system or the criteria which define
success within it’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979, p. 22).
Bourdieu uses the term ‘cultural capital’ to describe this familiarity with bourgeois
culture, the unequal distribution of which helps to conserve social hierarchy under the
cloak of individual talent and academic meritocracy (Wacquant, 1998). It refers to
stored ways of thinking about and understanding life where the ‘expected behaviours,
expected language competencies, the explicit and implicit values, knowledge, atti-
tudes to and relationship with academic culture required for success in school are
all competencies which one class brings with them to school’ (Henry et al., 1988,
p. 233). Yet ‘the school assumes middle-class culture, attitudes and values in all its
pupils. Any other background, however rich in experiences, often turns out to be a
liability’ (Henry et al., 1988, pp. 142–143, emphasis added).
The injustices of ‘allowing certain people to succeed, based not upon merit but
upon the cultural experiences, the social ties and the economic resources they have
access to, often remains unacknowledged in the broader society’ (Wacquant, 1998,
p. 216). Hence, the implicit demands of the educational system ‘maintain the preex-
isting order, that is, the gap between pupils endowed with unequal amounts of
cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 20) ‘behind the backs’ of actors engaged in the
school system—teachers, students, and their parents—and often against their will
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). That is, those involved in reproducing this social order
often do so without either knowing or wanting to do so (Bourdieu, 1998). In partic-
ular, teachers frequently do not see and often do not intend the social sorting that
schooling imparts on students.
For marginalized groups, the cultural capital of their families, the ways in which
they see and experience the world, is not highly valued in schools or at least by the
schooling system in general. For many of these students, access to dominant forms of
cultural capital is frequently limited to time at schools. We know that exposure to the
educative effects of the cultural capital of dominant groups is necessary for success at
school (Bourdieu, 1997). Paradoxically, those who are most in need of time in school
to accumulate the dominant cultural capital—as they are less likely to acquire it from
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436 C. Mills and T. Gale
their homes and communities—are also those who are least likely to be free from the
urgency of economic necessities. The reality is that time in school is a luxury and/or
an irrelevance for many poor, ethnic minority students.
It is this existence of a world characterized by socioeconomic and cultural inequal-
ities that motivates socially critical research. It is an approach to research that
attempts to dig beneath surface appearances, asking how social systems work, and
how ideology or history conceals the processes that oppress and control people, in
order to reveal the nature of oppressive mechanisms (Harvey, 1990). In this way, by
asking ‘whose interests are being served and how’ (Tripp, 1998, p. 37) in the social
arrangements we find, socially critical researchers hope to ‘work towards a more just
social order’ (Lenzo, 1995, p. 17) in which the subordinated may become ‘empow-
ered to take control of their lives and change the conditions which have caused their
oppression’ (Beder, 1991, p. 4). Implied here is that critical researchers are commit-
ted not just to knowing, but to transforming; to changing the world, to combating
discrimination and oppression (Figueroa, 2000). In this they seek to ‘go beyond …
describing ‘what is going on’ and explaining ‘why’…. For them, unmasking oppres-
sive structures and contributing to social and political change … is … integral to …
research’ (Troyna, 1995, p. 398).
It is on these grounds in particular that we claim Bourdieu as a socially critical
theorist, although some might question his commitment to imagining how things in
society and education might be different. At least regarding the first of critical theory’s
interests, Bourdieu harbors a concern that schooling reproduces society and provides
an explanation of how this system of reproduction of advantage and disadvantage in
education works. Yet, like many socially critical theorists, Bourdieu has been criti-
cized for his emphasis on reproduction at the expense of possible action to create a
new and different world. According to his critics, Bourdieu’s theory seems to leave no
room for notions like resistance (Grenfell & James, 1998a). However, in our view, his
work is widely misunderstood.
Take his concept of habitus, for example. Habitus, as Bourdieu uses the term, char-
acterizes the recurring patterns of class outlook—the beliefs, values, conduct, speech,
dress and manners—which are inculcated by everyday experiences within the family,
the peer group and the school. Implying habit, or unthinking-ness in actions, the
habitus operates below the level of calculation and consciousness, underlying and
conditioning and orienting practices by providing individuals with a sense of how to
act and respond in the course of their daily lives ‘without consciously obeying rules
explicitly posed as such’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 76). That is, the habitus disposes actors
to do certain things, orienting their actions and inclinations, without strictly deter-
mining them.
Within the Bourdieuian literature, habitus is both ‘generative (of perceptions and
practice) and structuring (that is, defining limits upon what is conceivable as percep-
tion and practice)’ (Codd, 1990, p. 139). Bourdieu’s attempt to ‘undermine the dual-
isms of objectivism and subjectivism, structure and agent, determinism and
phenomenology’ is a central element of his work (Kenway & McLeod, 2004, p. 528).
This creative yet limited capacity for improvisation reveals both the dynamic structure
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Researching social inequalities 437
of social reality and the constraint of social conditions where many of us believe there
to be choice and free will (Bourdieu, 1990a). The notion enables Bourdieu to analyze
the behavior of agents as ‘objectively coordinated and regular without being the prod-
uct of rules, on the one hand, or conscious rationality, on the other’ (Postone et al.,
1993, p. 4). In this sense, habitus transcends ‘determinism and freedom, conditioning
and creativity, consciousness and the unconscious, or the individual and society’
(Bourdieu, 1990b, pp. 54–55).
However, as Kenway and McLeod (2004, p. 528) point out, ‘there remains much
contestation over the extent to which this is ultimately an account of social determi-
nation and reproduction, where the habitus is reducible to the effects of the field, or
whether there is space for the improvisation of agents.’ Jenkins (2002, p. 21), among
others, argues that despite Bourdieu’s best efforts to ‘transcend the dualistic divide
between ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’ … [he] remains caught in an unresolved
contradiction between determinism and voluntarism, with the balance of his argument
favouring the former.’ Although concerned to give to practice an active, inventive
intention by insisting on the generative capacities of dispositions (Bourdieu, 1990a),
some suggest that Bourdieu does not give nearly enough credit to agency and the revo-
lutionary potential of agents. In their view, his world is far more reproductive than
transformative; his social universe ‘ultimately remains one in which things happen to
people, rather than a world in which they can intervene in their individual and collec-
tive destinies’ (Jenkins, 2002, p. 91). For example, Nash (1990, p. 445) maintains that
Bourdieu’s theory of practice ‘negates the theory of action, blurs the concept of choice,
and introduces confusion, circularity and pseudo-determinism.’ Similarly, Jenkins
(2002, p. 90) argues that despite Bourdieu’s ‘acknowledgement of, and enthusiasm
for, resistance, it is difficult to find examples in his work of its efficacy or importance.’
While we agree with Jenkins that Bourdieu’s conception of agency is somewhat
restrained, we tend to regard this as a strength, reflecting its relationship with an
equally restrained conception of structure. In short, ‘there is no such thing as pure
agency; but a kind of (limited) agency can be identified … [S]ubjects are able to nego-
tiate the rules, regulations, influences and imperatives that inform all cultural prac-
tice, and delimit thought and action, precisely because fields dispose them to do so’
(Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 540). Agency, then, is inextricably bound up with the
world (Schirato & Webb, 2003). That is: 
Bourdieu specifically rejects the idea of a knowing, transcendental consciousness … some-
how able to free itself from its history, social trajectories, and circumstances of thought.
All activity and knowledge … is always informed by a relationship between where the agent
has been and how their history has been incorporated, on the one hand, and their context
or circumstances (both in a general sense and ‘of the moment’), on the other. In other
words, agency is always the result of a coming together of the habitus and the specific
cultural fields and contexts in which agents ‘find themselves’, in both senses of the expres-
sion. (Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 541)
Bourdieu puts it best when he says that: 
… the habitus is a product of conditionings which tends to reproduce the objective logic of
those conditionings while transforming it. It’s a kind of transforming machine that leads
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438 C. Mills and T. Gale
us to ‘reproduce’ the social conditions of our own production, but in a relatively unpre-
dictable way, in such a way that one cannot move simply and mechanically from knowl-
edge of the conditions of production to knowledge of the products. (1993, p. 87, emphasis
in the original)
In a similar way, we argue that the same conceptual framework that he uses to explore
reproduction can also be employed to explain situations of rupture and transforma-
tion (Wacquant, 1998). Indeed, an emphasis on reproduction does not foreclose
contrary action such as revolutionary struggle (Calhoun, 1993). For Bourdieu, the
social universe is the site of endless and pitiless competition. It is struggle, not ‘repro-
duction’, that is the master metaphor at the core of his thought (Wacquant, 1998).
From their earliest beginnings, then, Bourdieu’s analyses of social practices were
intended to elucidate the workings of social power and offer a critical, not simply a
neutral, understanding of social life (Postone et al., 1993). What is problematic for
Bourdieu is the fact that the established order is not seen as problematic (Bourdieu,
1998). For Bourdieu, this is because justifications for the prevailing social order are
masked by ‘theoretical theory’ (Bourdieu, 1977) that offers explanations of social life
removed from a rigorous engagement with social practices. It is for these reasons that
we see a Bourdieuian methodology as having the potential to make a valuable contri-
bution in researching social inequalities in education: (i) because it is an approach to
research centrally concerned with the dialectic between the theoretical and the empir-
ical, important for theorizing ‘what is really going on’, and also (ii) because such
methodology has the potential to ‘denaturalise and to defatalize the social world … to
destroy the myths that cloak the exercise of power and the perpetuation of domina-
tion’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 49–50). Having outlined the focus of and
justification for Bourdieuian research, we move now to a discussion around how
Bourdieuian researchers produce knowledge about social inequalities.
A Bourdieuian method: producing knowledge about social inequalities
In advancing this research agenda of opening up social practices to critical scrutiny,
Bourdieu adopts a similarly open-ended approach to conducting research, guided
by a particular philosophical stance but not method prescriptive. That is, Bourdieu
preaches and practices methodological polytheism, deploying whatever data produc-
tion technique is best suited to the question at hand in his own research (Wacquant,
1998). For him, it is not simply a question of what technique to use and how to use
it, but rather why it is used and to what ends (Grenfell & James, 1998c). What
Bourdieu does hold to, though, is the continuous use of a set of interrelated concep-
tual metaphors: habitus, capital and field. These are central to his method and prac-
tice, and all other considerations flow from them. They are the pivot on which he
constructs his synthesis of subjectivism and objectivism (Grenfell & James, 1998c).
And, as explained above, they are also the mechanisms through which he explores
social inequalities.
It is this synthesis of object and subject that first characterizes Bourdieu’s method-
ology, which also explains his comfortableness with qualitative and quantitative data,
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Researching social inequalities 439
for example. A second characteristic is his insistence on participant objectivation,
given that all research is motivated by intrinsic interests of some kind. From
Bourdieu’s perspective, researchers need to recognize these personal biases—their
values, experiences and constructions—and acknowledge that these, as well as the
historical, ideological moment in which they live, will influence the direction of their
research. These theoretical and political characteristics of Bourdieu’s methodology
are taken up more fully below, first in relation to the theory that informs this meth-
odology and second with regard to its (political) practice.
Bourdieuian methodology in theory
Evident in Bourdieu’s methodology is a rejection of dualist constructions; the stuff of
‘bad’ theory. For example, Bourdieu transcends the seemingly antagonistic para-
digms of objectivism and subjectivism by turning them into ‘moments of a form of
analysis designed to recapture the intrinsically double reality of the social world’
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 10–11, emphasis in the original). The objective
structures, or spaces of positions—‘the distribution of socially efficient resources that
define the external constraints bearing on interactions and representations’ (Bourdieu
& Wacquant, 1992, pp. 10–11)—are introduced alongside ‘the immediate, lived
experience of agents in order to explicate the categories of perception and apprecia-
tion (dispositions) that structure their action from inside’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant,
1992, pp. 10–11, emphasis in the original).
According to Bourdieu, although the two moments of analysis are equally neces-
sary, they are not equal: ‘epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture over
subjectivist understanding’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 10–11). Bourdieuians
see the need to problematize what people say as something other than either simply a
reflection of ‘what is going on in their heads’ or a valid description of the social world
(Jenkins, 2002). Questions are raised about the degree to which the testimony of
research subjects is reliable and about the limits within which they can reflect
adequately upon their own practice (Jenkins, 2002).
At the same time, the poststructuralist understanding ‘that all groups have a
right to speak for themselves, in their own voice, and have that voice accepted as
authentic and legitimate’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 48) is central to Bourdieuian research.
Epistemological standpoints previously undervalued make up an important focus of
such research, creating spaces for marginalized voices to speak their own knowl-
edges. Poststructuralism’s close attention to ‘other worlds’ and to ‘other voices’
that have for too long been silenced (Harvey, 1989) lead many to claim that ‘it is
only from these standpoints that legitimate knowledge concerning them can be
generated and, in some cases, known’ (Gale, 1997, p. 104). Indeed, as Sandra
Harding (1998, p. 17) notes: 
Starting thought from the lives of those people upon whose exploitation the legitimacy of
the dominant system depends can bring into focus questions and issues that were not visi-
ble, ‘important,’ or legitimate within the dominant institutions, their conceptual frame-
works, cultures, and practices.
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440 C. Mills and T. Gale
Bourdieu seeks to overcome this opposition between ‘theoretical knowledge of the
social world as constructed by outside observers and the knowledge used by those
who possess a practical mastery of their world’ (Postone et al., 1993, p. 3) by attempt-
ing to accord validity to ‘native’ conceptions without simply taking those conceptions
at face value. He speaks of the artificiality both of the vision that he sometimes had
by observing things from a strictly objectivist point of view and of ‘the vision that
informants proposed [to him] when, in their concern to play the game, to be equal to
the situation created by the theoretical questioning, they turned themselves as it were
into the spontaneous theoreticians of their practice’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 21–22).
Utilizing Bourdieu’s theoretical perspective to inform data analysis, then, requires
researchers to look at the dynamic interaction between individuals and the surround-
ings in which they find themselves and situate their accounts within a larger historical,
political, economic and symbolic context. Bourdieu (in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992,
pp. 104–107) gives a very explicit account of what it means to analyze a field by think-
ing in terms of three distinct levels that direct the researcher to: 
1. analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power;
2. map out the objective structure of relations between the positions occupied by
agents who compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which the
field is the site; and
3. analyze the habitus of agents; the systems of dispositions they have acquired by
internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition.
Grenfell and James (1998c) claim that we can think similarly about education: as
systems of power hierarchies organized within society with consequent effects on indi-
viduals who both are produced by and reproduce them. At the first level (level 1),
there is the relationship between ‘education and the political and economic systems
of society. This relationship is crucial in terms of what is expected of education; how
it is organized and to what ends—in other words, what is valued and legitimate’
(Grenfell & James, 1998c, p. 169). Further: 
Education does not exist as a uniform totality, however, but is made up of a series of insti-
tutions and agents, each of which can be defined in terms of their position in the field as a
whole: the fields within the field (level 2). Different sectors—primary, secondary,
tertiary—have particular areas of activity, which each have specific legitimate terms of
governance. Such agents and institutions exist across and within sectors, and their posi-
tion can be defined ultimately in terms of their relations to each other and the values of the
field as a whole. However, there are also intra-institutional structural relations; that is, the
way an individual establishment is organized to reflect its competition for legitimate peda-
gogic products and resources from the field; for example, students and pupils, talented
staff, economic and cultural resources, academic achievement, etc. (Grenfell & James,
1998c, p. 169)
Finally, there is the habitus of the individuals involved (level 3): 
Such habitus, and the corresponding systems of dispositions, may well be expressed as the
organizational ethos of those senior managers who are attempting to apply nationally
defined policies; or, the professional activities, thoughts and beliefs of those being organized.
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Researching social inequalities 441
It may also include the habitus of students and pupils, and, ultimately, that of their families.
(Grenfell & James, 1998c, p. 169)
In producing knowledge, it is important not to consider one level without also taking
account of the other two. However, it is not always methodologically possible to
present analyses on each level simultaneously. To some degree they have to be sepa-
rated (Grenfell & James, 1998c).
Bourdieuian methodology in practice
A second characteristic of a Bourdieuian methodology concerns its politics; in partic-
ular, Bourdieu’s insistence that researchers recognize personal biases that may blur
the sociological gaze and acknowledge that these, as well as the historical, ideological
moment in which they live, will influence the direction of their research.
Like all social activity, critical social science is not value neutral. All research is
motivated by practical or intrinsic interests of some kind. Even if one starts with the
assumption that there exists one reality out there to be discovered (as positivists do),
this reality cannot be viewed as it ‘really is’ but only as seen through some value
window (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). That is, there is no perfectly transparent or neutral
way to represent the physical or social world. To suppose, for example, ‘that it is
possible for a human investigator to step outside his or her own humanness … by
disregarding one’s own values [and] experiences … is to believe in magic’ (Guba &
Lincoln, 1989, p. 67). Yet, ‘if research cannot be value neutral, it can be—and, if it
is to be ethical, it must be—value critical’ (Figueroa, 2000, p. 88). It is the responsi-
bility of researchers to ‘come clean’ about predispositions and feelings, to declare
their values, though even this is not sufficient. As researchers are often not fully
aware of their ‘taken-for-granteds’, values must be unearthed, clarified and ques-
tioned (Figueroa, 2000). As Bourdieu points out, the ground most difficult to see is
always the patch one is standing on (Pollitt, 2002).
Bourdieu’s (1990a) rejection of the distant gaze means that he necessarily operates
within what he analyses; he is both an analyst of science and society, and an actor in
these fields (Postone et al., 1993). In this very real sense, the critical sociologist also
occupies a position within the game. The objects of analysis within the field are ‘the
stakes in the game (capital), the strategies, the objectified histories of the agents
(their positions and habitus) including, ineluctably, that of the sociologist’ (Barnard,
1990, p. 78). This is why Bourdieu insists on participant objectivation: an objectiva-
tion of the social world that has made both the anthropologist and the conscious or
unconscious anthropology he engages in, his anthropological practice (Bourdieu,
2000). This objectivation leads to methodological reflexivity when social analysts
continually turn the instruments of their science back on themselves in an effort to
uncover everything that their point of view on social reality owes to their place in it
(Wacquant, 1993).
Bourdieu believes that three types of biases may blur the sociological gaze (Bourdieu
& Wacquant, 1992). The first is the social origins and coordinates, the position and
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442 C. Mills and T. Gale
trajectory in the social space of the individual researcher (for example, gender, class,
nationality, ethnicity, education, etc.). In fact, one of Bourdieu’s students, Charles
Soulié, has shown that research topics in philosophy and sociology are statistically
related to social origin and trajectory, gender and educational trajectory. This means
that: 
… our seemingly most personal choices, the most intimate and therefore most cherished
ones, our choice of discipline and of our favoured subjects … of our theoretical and meth-
odological orientations, have their origin in socially constituted dispositions in which
banally social, sadly impersonal properties still express themselves in a more or less trans-
figured form. (Bourdieu, 2000)
As the most obvious bias, the position of the researcher in the social space is the most
readily controlled by means of mutual and self-criticism (Bourdieu & Wacquant,
1992; Wacquant, 1998).
A second bias is linked to the position that the analyst occupies in the academic field
as distinct from the broader social structure: 
… that is, in the objective space of possible intellectual positions offered to him or her at a
given moment, and, beyond, in the field of power. The points of view of sociologists, like
any other cultural producers, always owe something to their situation in a field where all
define themselves in part in relational terms, by their difference and distance from certain
others with whom they compete. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 39)
Participant objectivation here aims to grasp everything that the thinking of the
researcher may owe to the fact that she/he: 
● is part of a field with its ‘traditions, habits of thought, problematics, shared self-
evidences’;
● occupies a particular position (for example, the newcomer who has to prove her/
himself); and
● has interests of a particular kind ‘which may unconsciously orient his [sic] scien-
tific choices, the choice of discipline itself, or, more precisely, the choice of this or
that method—qualitative or quantitative for example—or this or that object’.
(Bourdieu, 2000)
Indeed, according to Bourdieu (2000), the researcher’s ‘most decisive scientific
choices depend very closely on the position he [sic] occupies within his own profes-
sional universe.’ For Bourdieu (1984, pp. 12–13), then, objectivation is always bound
to remain partial, and therefore false, ‘so long as it fails to include the point of view
from which it speaks and so fails to construct the game as a whole.’
This particular bias is much less often discerned and pondered, and calls for ‘crit-
ical dissection of the concepts, methods, and problematics [the researcher] inherits as
well as for vigilance toward the censorship exercised by disciplinary and institutional
attachments’ (Wacquant, 1998, p. 225).
The third and most insidious source of bias is what Bourdieu refers to as an ‘intel-
lectual bias’—that is, ‘a tendency for subjects from certain fields (academe for one)
to abstract practices from their contexts, and see them as ideas to be contemplated
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rather than problems to be addressed or solved’ (Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 545).
This intellectualist bias, which entices us to construe the world as a spectacle: 
… as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved
practically, is more profound and more distorting than those rooted in the social origins or
location of the analyst in the academic field, because it can lead us to miss entirely the
differentia specifica of the logic of practice (Bourdieu 1990b, 1990c). (Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992, pp. 39–40, emphasis in the original)
When faced with the challenge of studying a world to which we are linked, often our
first thought is to deny our own involvement. According to Bourdieu (1988, p. 6),
this ‘concern to escape any suspicion of prejudice leads us to attempt to negate
ourselves as “biased” or “informed” subjects automatically suspected of using weap-
ons of science in the pursuit of personal interests.’ In Bourdieu’s (2000) view, nothing
is more false than this universally accepted maxim that the researcher must put noth-
ing of her/himself into her/his research. On the contrary, Bourdieu believes that a
researcher should constantly refer to her/his experiences, although not in a guilty,
unconscious or uncontrolled way.
As excessive proximity constitutes as much of an obstacle to scientific knowledge
as excessive remoteness, turning to study the historical conditions of the researcher’s
own production is particularly important for the sociologist who chooses to study
her/his own world (Bourdieu, 1988). Given that we are generally more indifferent to
the games in which we are ourselves involved, it is necessary for the researcher to
‘exoticize the domestic, through a break with his [sic] initial relation of intimacy with
modes of life and thought which remain opaque to him because they are too famil-
iar’ (Bourdieu, 1988, p. xi). Only a sociological self-analysis of this kind can really
assist to: 
… place the scholar in a position where he [sic] is able to bring to bear on his familiar world
the detached scrutiny which … the ethnologist brings to bear on any world to which he is
not linked by the inherent complicity of being involved in its social game, its illusio, which
creates the very value of the objectives of the game, as it does the value of the game itself.
(Bourdieu, 1988, p. xii, emphasis in the original)
Each of us, then, is encumbered by a past. For Bourdieu, it is only a reflexive sociol-
ogy that can help: 
… free intellectuals from their illusions—and first of all from the illusion that they do not
have any, especially about themselves—and can at least have the negative virtue of making
it more difficult for them to bring a passive and unconscious contribution to symbolic
domination. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 195)
It is important, then, for critical sociologists to cast a professional eye on the world of
their origin, to understand and deconstruct their own position in both the research
and the academic field. In doing so, research becomes a process of self-analysis in
which researchers attempt to grasp at a conscious level their own dispositions in order
to make sense of those they conduct their research with/on. As Kenway and McLeod
(2004) point out, this kind of reflexivity looks very much like innovations within femi-
nist and poststructuralist scholarship. Indeed: 
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444 C. Mills and T. Gale
… while many accounts do no more than notice (and often self-indulgently—vanity reflex-
ivity) the autobiography of the researcher, in other research texts methodological reflexiv-
ity is deployed in a stronger form, acknowledging the partiality of perspective and the
effects of different (structural and spatial) locations and power relations between
researcher and researched. Such claiming of reflexivity, in contrast to the simply individ-
ualizing autobiographical acknowledgments, connects more closely with the project of
reflexive sociology as described by Bourdieu. (Kenway & McLeod, 2004, p. 527)
Kenway and McLeod (2004) claim that a consciousness of our own positions and
dispositions within the field is something that feminist sociologists of education seek
to keep to the fore. ‘This includes the effect of our presence on the perspectives we
are offered by the various participants, and our own attachment to and construction
of particular perspectives and truths’ (Kenway & McLeod, 2004, p. 541).
The work of Bourdieu also encourages the researcher to avoid the symbolic violence
of imposing an interpretation on reality (Grenfell & James, 1998b). In other forms of
research, theorizing is something that is ‘the sole prerogative of qualified outsiders,
once compliant “subjects” have been conveniently milked’ (Smyth & Hattam, 2001,
p. 408). As the researcher selects, interprets and represents the data, the intended
meanings of participants inevitably become distorted and reshaped (Burke, 2002).
Checking interpretations and emerging constructions with respondents, then, is an
important part of the conclusion drawing and verification process for a Bourdieuian
researcher. The necessity of this reflects a realization by researchers that their inter-
pretation is partial and limited (Walker, 1983) and, thus, they must attempt to come
to understand how all those who are involved interpret behavior in addition to the way
they interpret it from their own perspective (Wilson, 1977). Reality is contested.
Bourdieuian researchers, as socially critical researchers, are ‘aware from the outset’
that their task is a political one involving ‘not simply telling the truth of this world …
but also showing that this world is the site of an ongoing struggle to tell the truth of
this world’ (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1989, p. 35).
Conclusion
According to Wacquant (2002, pp. 1–2), Bourdieu’s theory and politics are ‘less a
collection of fixed propositions and scholastic precepts than a “toolkit” forged by and
for research, aimed at posing scientifically those fruitful questions which, by tearing
the veil of taken-for-grantedness, enable us to see the social world, and ourselves, with
new eyes.’ Sociologists such as Bourdieu force us to make conscious those things that
we might prefer to leave unconscious, even though some may have a certain resistance
to such analysis. By bringing to light the arbitrary and the contingent where we like
to see necessity or nature, and social constraints where we like to see choice and free
will, critical sociologists, ‘like all prophets of evil tidings’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 15),
have often been condemned for their revelations. Nevertheless, Bourdieu et al. (1999,
p. 629) suggest that ‘what the social world has done, it can, armed with this knowl-
edge, undo.’ For example, increasing awareness of the mechanisms at work in the
reproduction of disadvantage in education may help by offering a measure of freedom
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to those manipulated by these mechanisms (Bourdieu, 1998) and improve access,
participation and educational outcomes for marginalized and disenfranchised groups.
Indeed: 
If it is true that it is not easy to eliminate or even modify most of the economic and social
factors behind the worst suffering, particularly the mechanisms regulating the labor and
educational markets, it is also true that any political program that fails to take full advan-
tage of the possibilities for action (minimal though they may be) that science can help
uncover, can be considered guilty of nonassistance to a person in danger. (Bourdieu et al.,
1999, p. 629)
However, we should not imagine that a Bourdieuian methodology is eclectic, that
‘anything goes’ in unmasking social and educational inequalities. As we have argued,
a focus on inequalities is a defining characteristic of Bourdieuian research but so too
is a critical regard for research practices themselves. Research that lacks this reflexiv-
ity is questionable in relation to both its outcomes and also its ethics. This is not to
say though that because of its reflexivity Bourdieuian methodology is beyond such
questioning. All research is partial, as we have acknowledged. However, what is
appealing about Bourdieu’s approach is its recognition of this and its interest in invit-
ing others to engage with this partiality.
In many ways, these two concerns—revealing how research is conceived and
the purposes of its conception—are ‘two translations of the same sentence’
(Spinoza in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 105): the interdependence of theory
and practice in the research endeavour. We believe that a Bourdieuian methodol-
ogy—with its interests in uncovering and transforming social inequalities, its theo-
retical dialecticism and radical democratic politics—has the potential to see
possibilities for socially just action in education realized.
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